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ABSTRACT 
The authors analyse the current (lack of) possibilities for user-
jurisdictions to tax the value generated by the increased use of digital 
intermediary platforms. Focus is on analysing the possibilities for user-
jurisdictions to tax the remuneration received by a foreign enterprise 
owning a digital intermediary platform and on disucussing whether the 
users’ provision of personal data in exchange for access to the platform 
could be considered a barter transaction for tax purposes in the user-
jurisdiction. Among other things, it is concluded that user-jurisdictions, 
pursuant to current international tax treaties, will normally be precluded 
from taxing the income of foreign platform enterprises, as the platform 
enterprises are often able to deliver their digital services remotely. 
Against this background, a number of tax policy challenges and options 
of relevance for taxing platform enterprises are discussed, in particular 
the proposed directive on significant digital presence recently put 
forward by the European Commisssion. It is concluded that the 
proposal may prove to be an adequate step towards taxation in the user-
jurisdictions, even though the proposal needs further work in order to 
become sufficiently clear and targeted and the scope may be limited.  
1. INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW AND THE DIGITAL 
CHALLENGE 
In recent years, it has become clear that the increasing digitalisation 
of the economy poses challenges with respect to international taxation, 
as current international tax law and its underlying principles have not 
kept pace with the changes in global business practices, including 
practices based on the intensified use of information and 
communications technology.1 Accordingly, as the current international 
tax framework was originally designed to deal with “brick and mortar” 
businesses, it may be argued that the framework is not sufficiently 
equipped to address modern, digitalised business practices, where 
physical presence in the market jurisdictions is no longer necessary.2 
Policymakers have discussed these challenges at least since the late 
1990s,3 but the attention has dramatically increased in later years. In 
particular, the OECD/G20 project aimed at mitigating base erosion and 
                                                        
1 Marcel Olbert and Christoph Spengel, ‘International Taxation in the Digital Economy: 
Challenge Accepted?’ (2017) 9 World Tax Journal 1.  
2 Georg Kofler et al., ‘Taxation of the Digital Economy: Quick Fixes or Long-Term 
Solution?’ (2017) 57 European Taxation 12. See also the same authors, ‘Taxation of the 
Digital Economy; A Pragmatic Approach to Short Term Measures’, (2018) 58 
European Taxation 4. 
3 See e.g. OECD, Taxation and Electronic Commerce – Implementing the Ottawa Taxation 
Framework Conditions (OECD Publishing 2001). For more on the earlier policy initiatives 
see e.g. Peter Koerver Schmidt, ‘Den digitale økonomi som skatteretlig udfordring’ in 
Børge Dahl et al. (eds), Liber Amicorum Peter Møgelvang Hansen (Extuto 2016).  
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profit shifting (BEPS) has attracted interest.4 The project focuses on 
aggressive tax planning carried out by multinational enterprises,5 and one 
of the deliveries consisted of a report specifically dealing with the tax 
challenges of the digital economy.6 Among other things, the report 
highlighted some key features of the digital economy that was seen as 
particularly relevant from a tax law perspective. These features for 
example included increased mobility, reliance on data, network effects 
and the spread of multisided business models. As such, the features of 
the digital economy were not considered to generate unique BEPS risks, 
but it was acknowledged that these features could exacerbate the risks.7 
The report also addressed a number of broader tax challenges 
raised by the digital economy, and a number of policy options were 
considered, however, without reaching an agreement on whether any of 
the options should be adopted.8 After the release of the report, the 
OECD/G20 has continued its work, and in March 2018 a new interim 
report was made publicly available.9 The new report further elaborates 
on the tax issues raised by digitalisation and concludes that, overall, there 
is support for undertaking a coherent and concurrent review of two key 
aspects of the existing tax framework, namely nexus rules and profit 
allocation rules.10   
                                                        
4 OECD, Adressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD Publishing 2013) and OECD, 
Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD Publishing 2013). 
5 For more on the background of the BEPS project see Yariv Brauner, ‘BEPS: An 
Interim Evaluation’ (2014) 6 World Tax Journal 1.  
6 OECD/G20, Adressing the Tax Challenges og the Digital Economy – Action 1 Final Report 
(OECD Publishing 2015). 
7 Ibid p. 11-12. 
8 Ibid p. 99 and p. 136-139.  
9 OECD/G20, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Interim Report (OECD 
Publishing 2018). Also academia has showed a massive interest in the tax challenges 
raised by the digital economy. Hence, several contributions in the academic literature 
have recently addressed the broader issues. Besides the contributions already mentioned 
see for example Ina Kerschner and Maryte Somare (eds.), Taxation in a Global Digital 
Economy (Linde Verlag 2017), Yariv Brauner and Pasquale Pistone, ‘Adapting Current 
International Taxation to the New Business Models: Two Proposals for the European 
Union’ (2017) 71 Bulletin for International Taxation 12, Joachim Englisch, ‘BEPS 
Action 1: Digital Economy – EU Law Implications’ [2015] British Tax Review 280, 
Maarten de Wilde, ‘Tax Jurisdiction in a Digitalizing Economy; Why Online Profits Are 
So Hard to Pin Down’ (2015) 43 Intertax 12, Miranda Stewart, ‘Abuse and Economic 
Substance in a Digital BEPS World’ (2015) 69 Bulletin for International Taxation 6/7, 
Aleksandra Bal and Carlos Gutiérrez, ‘Taxation of the Digital Economy’ in Madalina 
Cotrut (ed), International Tax Structures in the BEPS Era: An Analysis of Anti-Abuse 
Measures (IBFD 2015), Walter Hellerstein ‘Jurisdiction to Tax in the Digital Economy: 
Permanent and Other Establishments’ (2014) 68 Bulletin for International Taxation 
6/7, and Arthur Cockfield et al., Taxing Global Digital Commerce (Wolters Kluwer 2013). 
10 OECD/G20 (2018) [footnote 9], p. 212-213. It is contemplated that a final report 
should be published in 2020.  
ALLOCATION OF THE RIGHT TO TAX INCOME 
   
 
150 
In light of the topic of this article, it is particularly interesting that 
the interim report further elaborates on the significance of user-
participation in the value creation process of certain highly digitalised 
business models, including business models relying on digital 
intermediary platforms. Thus, even though consensus was not reached, 
the interim report reflects that a number of countries are of the opinion 
that the current international tax regime fails to recognise the 
contribution and importance of user participation in the value creation 
process of these highly digitalised businesses, as the existing nexus rules 
and profit allocation rules do not result in an appropriate alignment 
between the location in which profits are taxed and the location in which 
value is created.11                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Against this background, the authors of this article analyse the 
current (lack of) possibilities for user-jurisdictions to tax the value 
generated by the increased use of digital intermediary platforms.12 In this 
regard, it should be acknowleged that applicaple domestic tax laws often 
will provide sufficient legal basis for taxing the payment received by a 
user providing a service to another user through a digital intermediary 
platform, even though it might be difficult to enforce the tax in practise. 
For example legal basis often exists for taxing the proceeds received by 
an Uber-driver or the proceeds received by the letter of an apartment 
through Airbnb but enforcement may be difficult. However, these issues 
will not be addressed in this article.13 Instead, focus will be on analysing 
the possibilities for user-jurisdictions to tax the remuneration received by 
the enterprises owning the digital intermediary platform (hereinafter: the 
platform enterprises), and on disucussing whether the users’ provision of 
personal data in exchange for access to the platform could be considered 
a barter transaction for tax purposes in the user-jurisdiction.  
                                                        
11 Ibid p. 171-172. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss whether the view of 
these countries is actually appropriate or not. For a critical discussion see for example 
Eric C.C.M. Kemmeren, ‘Should the Taxation of the Digital Economy Really be 
Different’ (2018) 27 EC Tax Review 2 and Werner Haslehner, Taxing where value is created 
in a post BEPS (digitalized) World, Kluwer International Tax Blog  
<http://kluwertaxblog.com/2018/05/30/taxing-value-created-post-beps-digitalized-
world/> (24 August 2018). 
12 Only issues concerning direct taxation will be dealt with. 
13 Instead, see for example Giorgio Beretta, ‘Taxation of Individuals in the Sharing 
Economy’ (2017) 45 Intertax 1, and same author ‘The Taxation of the Sharing 
Economy’ (2016) 70 Bulletin for International Taxation 11, Nangel Kwong, ‘The 
Taxation of Sharing Economy Activities’ in Ina Kerschner and Maryte Somare (eds.), 
Taxation in a Global Digital Economy (Linde Verlag 2017), p. 61 et seq., Shu-Yi Oei and 
Diane M. Ring, ‘Can Sharing be Taxed?’ (2016) 93 Washington University Law Review 
4, Roberta A. Kaplan and Michael L. Nadler, ‘Airbnb: A Case Study in Occupancy 
Regulation and Taxation’, (2017) 82 University of Chicago Law Review Online 1, and 
Jane Bolander, ‘Deleøkonomi og skat’ in Børge Dahl et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum Peter 
Møgelvang Hansen (Extuto 2016), p. 29 et seq.    
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The analysis is divided in two main parts. The first main part 
contains an analysis and discussion of the possibilities for taxing the 
value creation in the user-jurisdiction under current tax regimes (section 
2). The second main part discusses a number of tax policy challenges and 
options of relevance for taxing platform enterprises, in particular the 
proposed directive on significant digital presence recently put forward, as 
part of the European Commisssion’s Digital Tax Package (section 3).14 
Finally, the article contains a section which recaptures the main 
conclusions (section 4). 
2. DIGITAL INTERMEDIARY PLATFORMS AND CURRENT TAX 
PRINCIPLES 
2.1. LACK OF TAXATION IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE USER 
In short, increased digitalisation – including the widespread use of 
the internet and mobile devices – has expanded the possibility of sharing 
goods and services beyond individuals’ social networks and immediate 
surroundings.15 In this context, digital intermediary platforms such as 
Uber and Airbnb have been able to turn the collaborative model into 
profitable, global businesses.16 Thus, the fact that digital intermediary 
platforms have significantly widened the possibilities for sharing 
property and services, including across national borders, has created new 
opportunities for both consumers and entrepreneurs and has raised 
issues with regard to the application of existing legal frameworks, 
including the tax framework.17  
From a tax perspective, sharing economy transactions may be 
divided into different kinds of transactions, one of which is cash 
transactions, where users of the network share personal goods or 
provide services on a peer-to-peer basis via digital intermediary platforms 
for a fee.18 In short, the business model of such digital intermediary 
                                                        
14 Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation 
of a significant digital presence, COM(2018) 147 final, and Proposal for a Council 
Directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from 
the provision of certain digital services, COM(2018) 148 final.  
15 Vassilis Hatzopoulos and Sofia Roma, ‘Caring for sharing? The Collaborative 
Economy under EU Law’ (2017) 54 Common Market Law Review, p. 81-128. 
16 For more on the business models of Uber and Airbnbp including related private law 
issues see Marie Jull Sørensen, ‘Private Law Perspectives on Platform Services: Uber – a 
business model in search of a new contractual legal frame?’ (2016) 5 Journal of 
European Consumer and Market Law 1, and Vanessa Mak, ‘Private Law Perspectives 
on Platform Services: Airbnb – Home Rentals between AYOR and NIMBY (2016) 5 
Journal of European Consumer and Market Law 1. 
17 Communication from the Commission on a European agenda for the collaborative 
economy, COM(2016) 356 final. and Giorgio Beretta, ‘The European Agenda for the 
Collaborative Economy and Taxation’ (2016) 56 European Taxation 9.  
18 For more on the different transaction types see Beretta (2017) [footnote 13].  
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platforms relies on a three-party relationship between the platform, the 
providing users and the buying users. Accordingly, the platform creates 
value by matching end-users for example drivers and passengers so that 
they can complete a ride on a pay-as-you-go basis. Consequently, such 
business models rely on a mediation technology which creates value by 
linking users of the network, as well as organise and facilitate the 
exchange between users, and ensure transaction quality using a review 
system whereby users have the option of rating the quality of the 
interaction. 
The activities performed by the platform enterprise thus generally 
include: 1) network promotion and contract management activities, for 
example related to inviting potential users to join the network, 2) service 
provisioning activities, for example related to matching the users, 
facilitating the supply of goods or services and the payment, and 3) 
network infrastructure operation activities related to maintaining and 
running a physical and information infrastructure.19   
In exchange for providing the mediation technology (typically in 
the form of an app-based market place), the platform enterprise takes a 
fee. For example, Uber takes a portion of the gross fares generated by 
partners (usually up to 20%, depending on the market), and Airbnb 
charges the hosts a fee of 3% on every booking plus an additional service 
fee paid by the guests up to 20%.20 
It is publicly known that some of the larger platform enterprises 
enjoy low effective taxation of their worldwide income, due to their tax-
efficient and often rather complex corporate structures that include 
entities in low tax jurisdictions.21 One element in this tax planning is to 
avoid establishing a taxable presence (nexus) in the jurisdictions where 
the users are located (hereinafter: the user-jurisdiction).22 For example, in 
the case of Uber, a subsidiary in the Netherlands processes the 
worldwide payments for all rides.23 Moreover, even though Uber has 
established subsidiaries in a number of countries where it operates, these 
subsidiaries do normally not attract a lot of taxable income, as they only 
                                                        
19 OECD/G20 (2018) [footnote 9], p. 38-40 and p. 66-73. Please see the report itself 
for a more elaborate description of such business models.  
20 <https://www.airbnb.dk/help/article/1857/what-are-airbnb-service-fees> (24 
August 2018), and Oei and Ring (2017) [footnote 13], p. 1002.  
21 Carrie Brandon Elliot, ‘Taxation of the Sharing Economy: Recurring Issues’ (2018) 
72 Bulletin for International Taxation 4a.  
22 Ibid. For more on the lack of a taxable nexus in the user-jurisdiction in the form of a 
permanent establishment see section 2.2.2 below. 
23 Even though the fees received are taxable, the effective taxation is low, among other 
things because the subsidiary in the Netherlands can deduct intra-group royalty 
payments.   
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provide low-risk support services that generally are remunerated on a 
cost plus-basis.24  
The fact that highly digitalised enterprises can provide their services 
without obtaining a taxable nexus in the user-jurisdictions has caused 
intense debate. Thus, it has been argued that even though data may be 
collected from the users without monetary consideration, these data 
constitute a key resource of highly digitalised businesses.25 Accordingly, it 
may be argued that the users become a kind of “virtual workers” for 
these digital enterprises and that it is troubling if these enterprises do not 
contribute with tax revenues to the jurisdictions where their users live 
and “work” for them.26 As the collaborative business models are 
characterised by high user participation intensity, this argument may also 
be made with respect to the contributions provided by users of digital 
intermediary platforms.27 
Against this background, section 2.2 takes a closer look at the 
interaction between the platform enterprise and its users. In this regard, 
it is discussed whether it is correct to consider the interaction between 
the platform enterprises and the users as one pure cash transaction, 
which is the payment of a service fee that can generally only be taxed in 
the user-jurisdiction if a taxable nexus is established there, or whether 
the interaction in addition contains some kind of barter transaction 
(section 2.2.1). Subsequently, issues concerning classification and 
allocation of the right to tax are analysed (section 2.2.2).    
2.2. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN PLATFORM ENTERPRISES AND USERS  
2.2.1. TRANSACTIONS RELEVANT FOR TAX PURPOSES 
 Before it is relevant to classify payments and allocate the taxing 
right for tax treaty purposes, it must be analysed whether and how the 
interaction between the platform enterprise and the users should be 
recognised for domestic tax purposes. Nevertheless, as it is outside the 
scope of this article to undertake a comprehensive comparative study of 
various domestic tax regimes, the analysis below is limited to outlining 
                                                        
24 Elliot (2018) [footnote 21], who states that Airbnb uses a setup similar to Uber’s. See 
also  Brian O’Keefe ‘How Uber plays the tax shell game’ (2015) Fortune Magazine (22 
October). 
25 HM Treasury, Corporate tax and the digital economy: position paper update (2018), p. 7 et seq. 
26 Nicolas Colin and Pierre Collin, Task Force on Taxation of the Digital Economy (2013), p. 
2. See also Raffaele Petruzzi and Svitlana Buriak ‘Addressing the Tax Challenges of the 
Digitalization of the Economy – A possible Answer in the Proper Application of the 
Transfer Pricing Rules?’ 72 Bulletin for International Taxation 4a, who argue that users 
who generate valuable data serve as “unconscious” contributers and/or employees. 
27 OECD/G20 (2018) [footnote 9], p. 56-59. Users must often disclose their 
preferences to access the services. Moreover, the users of digital platforms may be seen 
to bear the burden of verifying the product quality, e.g. by giving a rating or writing a 
review. 
ALLOCATION OF THE RIGHT TO TAX INCOME 
   
 
154 
the basic features of the interaction, based on the fact that no income tax 
systems appear to focus exclusively on cash compensation.28 In other 
words, in most income tax systems at least some non-cash barter 
transactions are considered to posess a taxable component.29  
As an example, the main principles in Danish tax law could briefly 
be considered. According to section 4 of the Danish State Tax Act, the 
main rule is that all income is taxable whether in money or in kind, 
unless the income consists of a gain from the disposal of private 
property, pursuant to section 5 of the Danish State Tax Act. In the case 
of provision of services, the provider will be taxable, if a payment is 
received in return for the service. In this respect, not only cash payments 
must be included but also payments in kind that objectively have 
economic value. This also applies if one service is traded in exchange for 
another service. For instance, if Person A paints Person B’s living room 
in exchange for Person B repairing Person A’s car, both services should 
in principle be valued and taxed. However, services may be so 
insignificant and the connection between them so weak that no taxation 
takes place.30 Yet, the borderline between a non-taxable interaction and a 
taxable barter transaction is not clear.31  
Even though national tax regimes are diverse, the following analysis 
and discussion of interactions between the platform enterprise and its 
users will be based on the working hypothesis that the general features of 
many tax systems are somewhat similar to the Danish tax regime when 
considering barter transactions for tax purposes.32 
In addition, it is assumed that the underlying rationale for treating 
(some) barter transactions as taxable events is often founded in (explicit 
                                                        
28 Beretta (2016) [footnote 13], who argues that this is the case no matter whether the 
domestic tax regime in question is a so-called global system or a scheduler system. 
29 Kwong (2017) [footnote 13], p. 66. 
30 Bolander (2016) [footnote 13], pp. 30-31. See also the report from the Danish 
Ministry of Taxation;, Rapport om vennetjenester/sort arbejde, eget arbejde, forbrug af egne varer, 
produkter og ydelser samt personalegoder (2002), in which it was stated that so-called tax-
exempt acts of friendship could be defined as customary non-commercial services 
between family, friends and the like caused by ordinairy helpfulness, generosity or social 
involvement. 
31 In 2012, the Danish legislator tried to elucidate when favours between friends and 
family are not taxable by introducing section 7 Å of the Danish Tax Assessment Act. 
For more on the traditional perception of the income concept in Danish tax law see Jan 
Pedersen et al., Skatteretten 1 (Karnov Group 2015), p. 208 et seq.,  Aage Michelsen et 
al., Lærebog om Indkomstskat (Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Folag 2017), p. 147 et seq., 
and Thøger Nielsen, Indkomst beskatning I (Juristforbundets Forlag 1965), p. 172. 
32 It is recognised that for example jurisdictions relying on old UK doctrines may be 
different as the judicial concept of income under those doctrines excludes benefits in 
kind that cannot be converted to cash. See Lee Burns and Richard Krever ‘Individual 
Income Tax’ in Victor Thuronyi (ed), Tax Law Design and Drafting (Kluwer Law 2000), 
pp. 507-508. 
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or implicit) neutrality considerations,33 broadly understood as the aim 
that taxes should not affect economic behaviour.34Accordingly, based on 
these assumptions, the economic substance of the interaction between 
the users and the platform enterprise will now be analysed and compared 
to how interactions similar in economic substance are normally treated 
for domestic tax purposes. 
It seems straightforward that the cash payment made by the user to 
the platform enterprise for the provision of various digital services shall 
be recognised for tax purposes. Accordingly, the cash payment will 
normally constitute taxable income in the hands of the recipient platform 
enterprise in the jurisdiction where the platform enterprise is resident 
according to domestic tax rules (unless the recipient enterprise is located 
in a tax haven). Moreover, the provisions on limited tax liability in the 
tax code of the user-jurisdiction may prescripe that tax, for example a 
withholding tax, shall be levied on the payment in the user jurisdiction 
(however, as explained in section 2.2.2. below the applicaple tax treaty 
will typically preclude taxation in the user-jurisdiction of payments from 
a user to a foreign platform enterprise).35 
In contrast to cash payments, there seems to be no consensus 
between countries on whether data collection from users as well as their 
participation and provision of content (for example trust generating 
reviews of other users of the platforms, user profile data, user locations 
in real time, credit card data and bank information) in return for access 
to the digital intermediary platform should be recognised as barter 
transactions between the users and the platform enterprise.36  
In the tax literature, barter transactions have recently experienced 
renewed topicality in relation to the raise of virtual currencies and 
cryptocurrencies in respect to whether these new currencies constitute 
means of payment or means of exchange.37 However, up until now, no 
                                                        
33 Ibid, pp. 507-508. See also Robert I. Keller ‘Taxation of Barter Transaction’ (1982) 
67 Minnesota Law Review 411, where the author argues that ’[a]ll taxpayers who engage in 
barter transactions are in the same economic position they would have been had they received cash for 
their goods or services in an amount equal to the value of the goods or services actually received and used 
that cash to purchase goods or services from the other party to the exchange.’. 
34 The broad definition of neutrality used in Simon James and Christopher Nobes The 
Economics of Taxation (Prentice Hall 1998), p. 306.  
35 According to Chang Hee Lee and Ji-Hyun Yoon, ‘General Report’ in International 
Fiscal Association (eds), Cahiers de droit fiscal international volume 103 B: 
Withhiolding tax in the era of BEPS, CIVs and the digital economy (Sdu 2018), p. 236, 
every country covered in the branch reportsrely on a withholding system to collect a 
number of taxes concerning non-residents.  
36 OECD/G20 (2018) [footnote. 9], p. 38-40. 
37 See for example Aleksandra Bal ’Stateless Virtual Money in the Tax System’ (2013) 53 
European Taxation 7 and the same author ‘Blockchain, Initial Coin Offerings and 
Other Developments in the Virtual Currency Market’ (2018) 20 Derivatives & Financial 
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relevant analysis of the distinction between barter transactions and other 
interactions, which neither constitute a money transaction nor a taxable 
barter transaction, seems to have been conducted for direct tax 
purposes.38 
No generally accepted definition of a barter transaction exists but 
one could be: ‘Transactions whereby products or services are directly exchanged 
between two suppliers without using money as a medium of exchange’.39 Four 
cumulative conditions in order for a transaction to be regarded a barter 
transaction can be derived from this definition. 
 First, the articles exchanged should be regarded as products or 
services. This should most likely be broadly interpreted as to include 
almost anything that may be controlled and offered for attention, 
acquisition, use or consumption etc. In this context, it seems difficult to 
argue that the supply of data by users of a platform, as well as the access 
to the platform provided by the platform enterprise, cannot be 
considered within the scope.40  
Second, the products or services should be exchanged, which in 
respect of barter transactions may be defined as: ‘the barter of the 
comparatively superfluous for the comparatively necessary’.41 This only seems to 
require that some right, for example to own or use a product, is given or 
some service is provided. That will likely include a platform enterprise’s 
right to collect user data, as well as the right for the users to access the 
platform.42 In respect of the term comparatively, this is a subjective 
measure and, consequently, it is challenging to determine whether the 
data and access to the platform are comparatively superfluous and 
necessary to the users and the platform enterprise. However, as the users 
                                                                                                              
Instruments 2 and Louise Fjord Kjærsgaard and Katja Dyppel Weber ‘Skattemæssig 
behandling af virtuelle valutaer’ [2018] Tidskrift for skatter og afgifter, 2.  
38 Piergiorgio Valente ‘Digital Revolution – Tax Revolution?’ (2018) 72 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 4a, lists the following question as one of the questions that are 
still pending: ‘Should consumers/users be taxed in respect of the deemed benefits derived from the 
transition of data owned?’ However, the author does not provide an answer. In the 
literature on VAT Sebastian Pfeiffer ’VAT on Free Electronic Services?’ (2016) 27 
International VAT Monitor 3, has discussed whether electronic services are subject to 
VAT where the consideration consists of personal data provided by the users.  
39 Julie Rogers-Glabush, IBFD International Tax Glossary (IBFD 2009), p. 35.  
40 It has been debated how to classify personal user data collected by enterprises. For 
example, Colin and Collin (2013) [footnote 26] discuss how to qualify data collected 
from users given that such data are not per se an intangible asset owned by the 
collecting enterprise.  
41 W. Stanley Jevons ’Money and the Mechanism of Exchange’ [1896] The International 
Scientific Series, p. 8 
42 For example in respect of Uber, both the driver and the passenger must sign an 
agreement which entails that a wide spectrum of driver and passenger data may be 
collected and used by Uber. 
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and the platform enterprise are generally unrelated, it seems reasonable 
to assume that this is the case.43 
Third, it has to be an exchange between two suppliers. Again, this 
seems to be a broad concept that may include most situations where a 
person provides products or services that people want or need, especially 
over a long period of time.44 In direct tax law, it is rarely necessary to 
discuss whether a given taxpayer should be seen as a “supplier”, as this is 
normally not decisive for the taxation. However, within other legal 
disciplines, it is a central question to answer. Accordingly, interpretive 
aid may perhaps be found in other fields such as indirect tax law and 
private international law.  
For VAT purposes, it has been discussed in the literature whether a 
highly digitalised business such as a platform enterprise is the only 
supplier of a service, or whether both the platform enterprise and the 
users should be considered taxable suppliers. The strongest arguments 
seem to support that the users of a platform should not be considered 
suppliers in a VAT context. This is based on the fact that users allegedly 
cannot be viewed as carrying out economic activities (economic 
exploitation with the purpose of obtaining income) and that the 
provision of personal data in order to gain access to the platform could 
constitute a mere form of payment similar to crypto currencies, which is 
accepted as a mean of payment for VAT purposes. However, uncertainty 
exists, as it could also be argued that the link between the service (access 
to the platform) and the consideration (provision of user data) is too 
weak to cause that the consideration could constitute a mere payment.45  
As crypto currencies are typically regarded as properties and not a mean 
of payment for direct tax purposes, it could be argued that the principles 
from VAT cannot be directly relied on in the analysis of whether the 
interaction between the users and the platform enterprise should be 
recognised as a barter transaction.46 
                                                        
43 See Keller (1982) [footnote 33], where it is stated ‘[…] that in most taxable exchanges the 
same basis figure would result whether the taxpayer used the value received or the value given up theory 
of cost, since generally the value of two exchanged in an arms length transaction are either equal in fact, 
or are presumed to be equal.’. 
44 See for example the general definition of supplier in Cambridge Dictionary 
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/>. 
45 Pfeiffer (2016) [footnote 38]. Even though VAT law may provide some inspiration, it 
should be kept in mind that there are fundamental differences between the underlying 
principles of direct tax law and indirect tax law. See Karina Kim Egholm Elgaard, 
Interaktion mellem momsretten og indkomstskatteretten (Jurist- & Økonomforbundets Folag 
2016), p. 131 et seq. 
46 Bal (2013) [footnote 37], Kjærsgaard and Weber (2018) [footnote 37] and 
administrative practice from the Danish Tax Council, decision of 9 March 2018, 
SKM2018.104.SR, decision of 3 April 2018, SKM2018.130.SR, decision of 31 August 
2017, SKM2017.520.SR, and decision of 1 April 2014, SKM2014.226.SR. 
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In private international law, emphasis is often put on who provides 
the characteristic performance of the transaction with respect to 
determining the applicable law in the absence of choice. In this regard, 
where a party enters into a contract in the course of his trade or 
profession, it is rebuttably presumed that this is the party that provides 
the characteristic performance which again means that the other party is 
considered a buyer and not a supplier.47 Nevertheless, if it is not possible 
to identify a single party that provides the characteristic performance of a 
transaction, the presumption does not apply.48 Accordingly, if relying on 
these principles from international private law, the interaction between 
the platform enterprise and the users could only be viewed as a barter 
transaction if none of the parties can be seen as the party providing the 
characteristic performance.        
Fourth, money cannot be used as a means of payment in the 
transaction; hence, barter transactions should be distinguished from sale 
and purchase of products and services in which money is exchanged. 
Even though a fee is typically paid by the user for acquiring a service 
through a digital intermediary platform, it should be noted that the 
recipient of the fee will not necessarily be the same group entity as the 
entity collecting the user data, and that it may be possible to split the 
overall interaction into a monetary transaction, as well as a non-monetary 
transaction.49 Moreover, it is typically possible to access the platform 
without actually acquiring anything, and even in that case, user data is 
collected and used. Correspondingly, in a number of situations, personal 
data seems to be exchanged for access to the platform. Although, no 
generally accepted definition of money exists for tax purposes, neither of 
the articles exchanged between the users and the platform enterprise 
have the general characteristics of money known from economic theory, 
that is something which can be used as a medium of exchange, a 
measure of value, a standard value, and storage of value.50  
                                                        
47 Article 4 (2) of  the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
(adopted 19 June 1980, entry into force 1991) (hereinafter: The Rome Convention). See 
Richard Plender and Michael Wilderspin, The European Private International Law of 
Obligations (Sweet & Maxwell 2009), p. 169. 
48 Ibid. 
49 As mentioned in section 2.1. above, in the case of Uber a subsidiary in the 
Netherlands processes the worldwide payments for all rides, whereas the data seems to 
be collected and used by the headquarter entity, see OECD/G20 (2018) [footnote 9], p. 
67. 
50 Jevons (1896) [footnote 41], pp. 13-18. In Danish administrative practice, the Danish 
Tax Council has stated that from a Danish domestic tax law perspective for an article to 
be regarded as money it must be: (1) regulated by the global currency market, (2) 
subject to regulation by a central bank, (3) redeemable, and (4) affiliated with a 
jurisdiction or currency area. See decision of 25 March 2014, SKM2014.226.SR, 
regarding the qualification of Bitcoins, and decision of 22 August 2017,  
SKM2017.520.SR regarding the qualification of Bookcoins.  
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If the interaction can be viewed as a barter transaction, the 
interaction could potentially give rise to income taxation on both sides of 
the transaction, depending on the applicable domestic tax law. The 
underlying reason is that splitting the interaction in two separate supplies 
in consideration for money does not change the economic substance of 
the transaction.51 
However, generally, tax systems accept that various kinds of 
interactions are not relevant for tax purposes. An example could be the 
social interaction between two colleagues discussing an issue. This 
discussion may be of mutual benefit if both colleagues thereby gain new 
insights. Nevertheless, typically, such interactions are viewed as social, 
everyday interactions where the link between the interaction and the 
creation of economic value are considered too weak to be recognised for 
tax purposes. Accordingly, if the interaction between the users and the 
platform enterprise can be considered similar to such social, everyday 
interactions, it normally implies that the interaction is not relevant for tax 
purposes for any of the parties. 
Altogether, there does not seem to be a clear and general answer to 
how the interaction between the users and the platform enterprise shall 
be viewed, among other things because all interactions between users 
and the various platforms are not completely alike and since the existing 
tax regulations have not been drafted with such digital transactions in 
mind.52 However, it seems far-fetched to compare the interactions 
between the users and the platform enterprise to social, everyday 
interactions, as at least the platform enterprise has a clear commercial 
rather than social motive. Further, there seems to be a clear link between 
the collection and use of data and the creation of economic value for the 
platform enterprise.53 In addition, as most users would probably not 
allow the collection of user data or would not spend time on writing 
reviews etc. without getting something in return, it seems reasonable to 
presume that the users’ access to the platform provides some kind of 
(economic) value for the users, for which the users might otherwise 
would have been willing to pay for in cash. 
 Consequently, for direct tax purposes, it could be argued that the 
non-monetary part of the interactions between the platform enterprise 
and the users appear to have quite strong similarities with a recognisable 
                                                        
51 Keller (1982) [footnote 33] 67 Minnesota Law Review 411, where the author argues 
that ‘[a]ll taxpayers who engage in barter transactions are in the same economic position they would 
have been had they received cash for their goods or services in an amount equal to the value of the goods 
or services actually received and used that cash to purchase goods or services from the other party to the 
exchange.’ 
52 Apart from viewing the interaction as either a barter transaction or a social, everyday 
event some intermediary outcomes could also be considered. For example, it could be 
considered whether the platform should be seen as the only part providing a service, 
and the users as a “pure” buyer paying in kind, or vice versa. 
53 OECD/G20 (2018) [footnote 9], p. 29.  
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barter transaction. This may, at least in theory, give rise to income 
taxation on both sides of the transaction, if the applicable domestic tax 
legislation has similarities with the main principles of the Danish regime 
and an applicable tax treaty allocates the right to tax the user of such 
income to the user-jurisdiction, for example as ‘business income’ or 
‘other income’. 
Nevertheless, even though it may be possible for the user-
jurisdiction to find legal basis in current tax regulations for taxing 
resident users of the receipt of a payment in kind (in the form of access 
to the platform), no jurisdictions are, to our knowledge, currently 
enforcing such taxation.54 One reason for this could obviously be that 
taxpayers, tax authorities, and courts do not agree or are not (yet) aware 
that such legal basis may be found in the applicable domestic tax 
legislation. However, in practice, it may also play a role that enforcing 
such taxation would entail severe practical challenges, inter alia, because 
of difficulties with valuation of the payments in kind.55 Further, there 
seems to be a risk that the costs associated with controlling and 
collecting such taxes will be significant compared to the tax revenue 
collected, as the value of each barter transaction is likely to be low, 
whereas the volume of barter transactions could be massive.56 Finally, 
the taxation of users on the access to digital intermediary platforms 
would conflict with a number of other principles underpinning most tax 
systems. For example, it must be expected that individual taxpayers will 
have a hard time understanding and accepting being taxed, just because 
they obtain access to a platform.57 
As a consequence of the fact that user-jurisdictions in practice are 
not levying tax on users receiving a payment in kind in the form of 
access to a platform, the following section on classification for tax treaty 
purposes will only address issues related to the payment from users to a 
foreign platform enterprise. In other words, the section below will only 
                                                        
54 It is generally recognised that income tax systems struggle to capture transactions 
where money is not used as a medium of payment on either side of the transaction see 
OECD/G20, (2018) [footnote 9]. 
55 OECD, Exploring the Economics of Personal Data: A Survey of Methodologies for Measuring 
Monetary Value (OECD Publishing 2013). Further, it seems impossible to distinguish 
how much value is associated with the data of a specific user, as this depends on inter 
alia the scale and quality as well as the specific business model adopted by the 
enterprise, see also Olbert and Spengel (2017) [footnote 1]. Less debated, though 
equally challenging, is the valuation of the access provided to the users. 
56 OECD/G20, (2015) [footnote 6], p. 100. 
57 Carrying out such taxation of a potentially very high number of low value user 
transactions could in practice conflict with underlying objectives such as simplicity, 
administrability, fairness and efficiency. For a general and critical discussion of the 
various objectives see Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics 
(Princeton Press 2008), p. 37 et seq.  
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consider the allocation of taxing rights with respect to the income 
received by the platform enterprises (not by the users). 
2.2.2. CLASSIFICATION FOR TAX TREATY PURPOSES  
The development and wide spread use of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital (hereinafter: the OECD Model) 
has supported the so-called ‘classification and assignment of sources 
method’ which means that income is classified under a number of 
categories and taxing powers are assigned to each state for each category 
of income.58 However, as described and analysed above, the digitalisation 
has enabled monetisation in new ways that raise questions regarding 
both the rationale behind the existing classifications of income and the 
consistency of the treatment of similar types of transactions.59 
In regard to the classification of payments in digital transactions, 
the Technical Advisory Group concluded in its report from 2001 
(hereinafter: The TAG Report)60 that one of the most important 
classification issues were the distinction between business income and 
royalties corresponding to Article 7 and 12 of the OECD Model, 
assuming that all payments are received in the course of carrying on a 
business.61 This distinction is also of importance with respect to the 
classification of payments from the users to the platform enterprise, as it 
potentially affects the allocation of the right to tax. The reason is that 
numerous bilateral tax treaties allow the source state (the user-
jurisdiction) to withhold a tax on royalty payments, whereas the right to 
tax business income is exclusively granted to the domicile state unless the 
income should be allocated to a taxable permanent establishment 
(hereinafter: PE), located in the source state, pursuant to Article 7 of the 
OECD Model (2017).62 In other words, so-called nexus is needed in the 
user-jurisdiction, in order for the user-jurisdiction to be able to tax the 
income of a foreign platform enterprise. 
                                                        
58 Chang Hee Lee, ‘Impact of E-Commerce on Allocation of Tax Revenue between 
Developed and Developing Countries’ in Reuven Avi-Yonah (ed), International Tax Law 
Vol. 1 (Edward Elgar Publ. 2016) and Michael J. Graetz and Michael M.O’Hear ‘The 
Original Intent of U.S. International Taxation’ in Reuven Avi-Yonah (ed), International 
Tax Law Vol. 1 (Edward Elgar Publ. 2016), with reference to David Rosenbloom and 
Stanley I. Langbein ‘United States Tax Treaty Policy: An Overview’ (1981) 19 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 359, who view the choice of classification and assignment 
as the basic structure for virtually all current bilateral tax treaties.  
59 OECD/G20 (2015) [footnote 6], p. 98 et seq.    
60 OECD Technical Advisory Group on Treaty Characterisation of Electronic 
Commerce Payments, Tax Treaty Characterisation Issues Arising from E-commerce (1 
February 2001 and adopted by the OECD Council in July 2002). 
61 Ibid, p. 4.  
62 Lee and Yoon (2018) [footnote 35], p. 238. See also Hanna Litwinczuk ‘Poland: 
Payments for Copyrights of Computer Software as Royalties’ in Michael Lang et al. 
(eds) Tax Treaty Case Law around the Globe (IBFD 2011), pp. 288-299.   
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According to the main rule in Article 5(1) of the OECD Model 
(2017), a PE means a fixed place of business through which the business 
of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on. However, as physical 
presence is required in order to create a PE, digital enterprises have the 
possibility of providing their services in the user-jurisdiction remotely 
without establishing a PE. For example, platform enterprises provide 
their services remotely through digital intermediary platforms and 
thereby generally avoid establishing a PE in the user-jurisdiction. 
Moreover, as the number of matches made by the platform between 
end-users are only limited by computer power, the scale and 
geographical scope of the platform enterprises’ activities may be 
comprehensive, even though no taxable nexus is established.63 
Recently, amendments have been made to the PE-definition in the 
OECD Model (2017) and its commentaries.64 However, as physical 
presence is still used as the nexus-defining criterium, many digital 
business models, including platform enterprises, will still be able to 
provide their digital services without establishing a PE in the user-
jurisdictions.65 
Nevertheless, it should be recalled that Article 7 is secondary to 
Article 12 of the OECD Model (2017) if an enterprise does not carry on 
its business through a PE in the source state (the user-jurisdiction). 
Accordingly, it must initially be considered whether the payment 
                                                        
63 OECD/G20 (2018) [footnote n. 9], p. 70-71. 
64 The amendments were prescribed in OECD/G20, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of 
Permanent Establishment Status – Action 7 Final Report (OECD Publishing 2015). A 
number of bilateral tax treaties will incorporate these changes through the adoption of 
the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, (signed on 7 June 2017, entry into force on 1 July 
2018). 
65 Peter Hongler and Pasquale Pistone, Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business 
Income in the Era of the Digital Economy, IBDF Working Paper 20 January 2015, and 
Kofler et al. (2017) [footnote 2]. The 2017-amendments to Article 5 of the OECD 
Model with Commentary included an expansion of the dependent agent-test, a 
tightening of the independent agent criteria, and a narrowing of the PE-exemptions for 
preparatory and auxiliary activities. However, several countries that have signed the 
Multilateral Instrument have chosen not to apply the amended PE definition. No 
analysis of the (amended) PE definition will be conducted in this article, as several 
other contributions in the literature have already done this. See for example Vishesh 
Dhuldhoya, ‘The Future of the Permanent Establishment Concept’ (2018) 72 Bulletin 
for International Taxation 4a, Peter Blessing, ‘Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of 
PE in Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) – Impact for European and 
International Tax Policy’ in Robert Danon (ed.), Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) – 
Impact for European and International Tax Policy (Schulthess, 2016), Daniel W. Blum 
‘Permanent Establishments and Action 1 on the Digital Economy of the OECD Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative – The Nexus Criterion Redefined’ 69 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 6/7, and Anders Nørgaard Laursen, ‘Ændringer af fast 
driftsstedsdefinitionen afledt af BEPS-projektet’, [2018] SR-Skat, p. 111 et seq. 
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received by the platform enterprise constitutes a royalty. In this respect, 
it should be noted that the definition of royalties varies in bilateral tax 
treaties, though it is often inspired by the definition of royalties included 
in Article 12 (2) of the OECD Model (2017): 
The term ‘royalties’ as used in this Article means 
payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use 
of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic or 
scientific work including cinematograph films, any patent, 
trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, 
or for information concerning industrial, commercial or 
scientific experience. 
The word ‘payment’, as used in the definition, should be 
interpreted broadly and only requires the fulfilment of an obligation to 
put funds at the disposal of the creditor in the manner required by 
contract or by custom.66 Consequently, a payment does not need to be in 
cash to be within the scope of the definition.67 Hence, the cash fee as 
well as the data provided by the users of a platform (if presumed that the 
data also forms part of the taxable part of the remuneration to the 
platform), could potentially be classified as royalties. However, the 
classification of payments between the users and the platform enterprise 
shall be based on a thorough analysis of the facts on a case-by-case basis. 
Nonetheless, it must be expected that the payment, as a starting point, 
could often be considered a payment related to a mixed contract.68 
According to The TAG Report and the commentaries to Article 
12(2) of OECD Model (2017), a payment in consideration for know-
how and copyrights concerning software shall only in relatively rare cases 
be classified as royalties. This is based on the understanding that such 
payments are generally for the provision of services using underlying 
copyrights or know-how and not for the right to use or be imparted in the 
copyrights or knowhow.69 This also seems to be the case with respect to 
                                                        
66 Para.  8.3 of the commentaries to Article 12 of the OECD Model (2017). 
67 Matthias Valta, ‘Income from Royalties’ in Ekkehart Reimer and Alexander Rust 
(eds), Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (Wolters Kluwer 2015), p. 993. 
68 Such mixed contracts should be broken down, on the basis of the information 
contained in the contract or by means of a reasonable apportionment and classified 
separately except if; (i) one part of what is being provided constitutes by far the 
principal purpose of the contract, and (ii) the other parts are only of an ancillary and 
largely unimportant character. In such cases, the classification of the principal part 
should generally be applied to the whole amount of the consideration, according to 
para. 11.6 (know-how) and 17 (software) of the Commentaries to Article 12 of the 
OECD Model (2017). 
69 OECD Technical Advisory Group on Treaty Characterisation of Electronic 
Commerce Payments (2001) [footnote 60], p. 5 and 7. See also para. 11-11.6 (know-
how) and 12-17.4 (software) of the commentaries to Article 12 of the OECD Model 
(2017). 
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the payment made to a platform enterprise, as the users are not given 
information on the ideas and principles underlying the platform, such as 
the logic, algorithms, programming languages or techniques.70 
Consequently, the payment should typically be classified as business 
income, according to Article 7 of the OECD Model (2017) which entails 
that the user-jurisdiction will not be entitled to tax the income, if the 
platform enterprise does not have a PE in the user-jurisdiction. 
It should be mentioned that some bilateral tax treaties contain an 
expanded royalty definition which also includes payments for the 
provision of technical services and that the scope of ‘technical’ is 
disputed. The prevailing understanding, however, seems to be that 
making data and software, or functionality of that data or software, 
available for a fee does not constitute a service of a technical nature.71 
On this basis, it could be argued that even with an expanded definition 
of royalties, the payments from the users to the platform enterprise 
(whether in cash or in personal data) shall typically be classified as 
business income and shall therefore not be taxable in the user-
jurisdiction, assuming that no PE of the platform enterprise is 
established. 
Consequently, if the user-jurisdiction cannot tax the income of the 
platform enterprise and in practice cannot either carry out taxation of the 
users, the user-jurisdiction will be left with nothing to tax with respect to 
value generated in the interaction between the platform enterprise and 
the users.72 On this basis, it is a fact that some countries wish to explore 
other opportunities for establishing a taxing right in the user-jurisdiction. 
Some of these initiatives will be discussed further in section 3. 
3. POLICY CHALLLENGES AND OPTIONS 
3.1. UNILATERAL AND OECD REACTIONS 
Currently, and as explained above, user-jurisdictions are normally 
not entitled to tax the income of a foreign platform enterprise, if the 
enterprise does not have physical presence in the user-jurisdiction in the 
form of a PE. Moreover, even though it may be possible for the user-
jurisdiction to find legal basis for taxing resident users of the receipt of a 
                                                        
70 For illustrative examples see para. 11.5 and 14.3 in the commentaries to Article 12 of 
the OECD Model (2017). 
71 OECD Technical Advisory Group on Treaty Characterisation of Electronic 
Commerce Payments (2001) [footnote 60], p. 15. Whether ‘technical’ should be 
understood strictly in the context of know-how, industrial IP and secrets, or as to 
having a wider meaning is debated in international tax literature, see for example 
Matthias Valta (2015) [footnote 67], p. 1019-1021, where the author summarises and 
discusses the various views. 
72 Obiously, the providing user of a platform will typically be taxable in the user-
jurisdiction depending on the applicable domestic tax law. However, this is outside the 
scope of this article, as explained en section 1.  
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payment in kind (in the form of access to the platform), no jurisdictions 
are, to our knowledge, currently enforcing such taxation.  
Against this background, and because similar challenges occur in 
relation to other digital business models, it is not surprising that some 
countries have made an effort to explore new opportunities for 
establishing a taxing right in the user-jurisdiction. 
A part of these efforts has been made under the auspices of the 
OECD. Thus, besides the targeted initiatives that were agreed upon in 
the course of the BEPS project,73 a number of broader tax policy 
options, enabling (some) taxation in the user-jurisdiction, have been 
discussed, including; 1) a new nexus in the form of a significant 
economic presence, 2) a withholding tax on certain types of digital 
transactions, and 3) an equalisation levy. However, for various reasons, 
none of the options were agreed upon and recommended.74 
Even though no agreement was reached with respect to the 
broader tax challenges, the BEPS Report on Action 1 stated that 
countries could introduce any of these three options in their domestic 
laws or tax treaties as additional safeguards against BEPS (provided they 
respect existing treaty obligations).75 Perhaps as a consequence of this, a 
number of countries have taken such unilateral action.76 India, Hungary, 
and Italy have for example adopted rules that (will) impose equalisation 
levies on certain kind of digital services, and both the UK and Australia 
have introduced a so-called diverted profits tax. Moreover, Israel has 
introduced rules that create a taxable nexus in Israel if the foreign 
enterprise has a digital PE there. Finally, and of particular interest for the 
topic of this article, it should be mentioned that Slovakia has introduced 
a new broad PE concept to encompass ride and room-sharing 
intermediation services.77 
As already mentioned, it is understandable that some countries feel 
a need to take action in order to protect their tax bases from the 
challenges caused by highly digitalised business models. However, the 
proliferation of unilateral approaches may have severe adverse impacts 
                                                        
73 Including the amendments to the PE definition mentioned in section 2.2.2. 
74  OECD/G20 (2015) [footnote 6], p. 13 and p. 97 et seq. For elaborate proposals on 
how the PE concept could be extended and how to use withholding taxes to address 
the challenges raised by the digital economy see Peter Hongler and Pasquale Pistone, 
(2015) [footnote 65] and Yariv Brauner and Andrés Baez, Withholding Taxes in the Service 
of BEPS Action 1: Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Working paper of 2 
February 2015 (IBFD 2015) . 
75 OECD/G20 (2015) [footnote 6], p. 13 and p. 97 et seq. 
76 The lack of consensus is also reflected in the interim 2018-report, even though the 
report states that continued work is undertaken in order to reach a consensus-based 
solution by 2020. See OECD/G20 (2018) [footnote 9], p. 212-213. 
77 For a recent overview of the various unilateral initiatives see Lee Sheppard, ‘Digital 
Permanent Establishment and Digital Equalization Taxes’ (2018) 72 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 4a. 
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on investment and growth, inter alia, due to the increased risk of double 
taxation, as well as increased interpretational complexity. This concern is 
also shared by the European Commission which is of the opinion that 
the adoption of unilateral and divergent approaches by Member States 
could be ineffective and fragment the single market by creating national 
policy clashes, distortions and tax obstacles for businesses in the EU. 
Accordingly, the European Commission finds that coordinated initiatives 
are needed.78      
3.2. THE EU PROPOSAL ON SIGNIFICANT DIGITAL PRESENCE 
For quite some time, the EU has been engaged in discussions and 
initiatives addressing the tax challenges raised by highly digitalised 
businesses, including the challenges caused by the increased use of digital 
intermediary platforms.79 In continuation of these efforts, the European 
Commission has recently proposed two new directives. The first 
directive proposal is laying down rules that should enable member states 
to tax income generated in their territory if the taxpayer is considered to 
have a significant digital presence in the member state (even without 
having physical presence).80 Moreover, the second directive introduces 
an interim solution enabling member states to levy a tax of 3% on 
revenues from certain types of digital services (digital services tax), where 
the main value is created through user participation.81 
Below, the proposal laying down rules relating to a significant 
digital presence is analysed in further detail. Particular focus will be on 
the elements of relevance for platform enterprises, despite the fact that 
the directive has a broader scope. The proposal on a digital services tax is 
not addressed. The reasons for focusing on the first proposal are, among 
other things, that the digital service tax is only proposed as an interim 
measure, it is not a tax on income (but on turnover), the digital services 
tax has already received severe criticism by academic scholars,82 and the 
whole idea seems to lack substantial support from member states.83  
                                                        
78 Directive Proposal COM(2018) 147 final [footnote 14], p. 5. 
79 European Commission, Commission Expert Group on Taxation of the Digital Economy – 
Report (2014). See also Bjørn Westberg, ‘Taxation of the Digital Economy – An EU 
Perspective’ (2014) 54 European Taxation 12, and Paolo Centore and Maria Teresa 
Sutich, ‘Taxation and the Digital Economy: Europe is Ready’ (2014) 42 Intertax 12. 
80 Directive Proposal COM(2018) 147 final [footnote 14]. 
81 Directive Proposal COM(2018) 148 final [footnote 14]. 
82 Johannes Becker and Joachim English, EU Digital Services Tax: A Populist and Flawed 
Proposal, Kluwer International Tax Blog  <http://kluwertaxblog.com/ 
2018/03/16/eu-digital-services-tax-populist-flawed-proposal/> (24 August 2018), and 
Eric C.C.M. Kemmeren (2018) [footnote 11].   
83 In a questionnaire sent to the Member State’s tax authorities, only 9 respondents 
answered that they believe that a digital services tax would solve the current problems. 
See Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2018) 81 final/2, p. 94. 
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The basic idea behind the first proposal is to extend the currently 
applied PE-concept in order to include a significant digital presence84 
and to set out new principles for attributing income to such significant 
digital presence, as new attribution rules are needed in order to better 
capture the value creation of highly digitalised business models.85 
According to Article 2, the proposed directive shall apply only for 
purposes of corporate tax in each Member State and should apply to 
entities irrespective of where they are resident for tax purposes.86 
However, in order to not violate the Member States’ tax treaties with 
third countries, it follows that the directive should not apply to entities 
resident in third countries if the Member State has concluded a tax treaty 
with that third state and the treaty does not include provisions similar to 
the proposed provisions on significant digital presence.87 This exception 
is obviously necessary in order to not cause treaty override, but it may 
entail a significant reduction of the scope of the new rules if the Member 
States are not successful or sufficiently interested in re-negotiating their 
tax treaties with third countries. 
According to Article 4(1), a PE will be considered to exist if a 
significant digital presence exists through which a business is wholly or 
partly carried on. The phrase ‘through which a business is wholly or partly 
carried on’ is also used with respect to the existing PE-rule set out in 
Article 5(1) of the OECD Model (2017). However, in that context, the 
phrase is usually meant to indicate that persons who, in one way or 
another, are dependent on the enterprise (personnel) conduct the 
business of the enterprise in the State in which the fixed place is 
situated.88 Given that  a significant digital presence of for example a 
platform enterprise may exist, even if no personnel is carrying on 
                                                        
84 Accordingly, it follows from Article 4(2) of the proposed directive that the new 
concept must be viewed as an addition that does not affect or limit the application of 
any other test under EU law or national law for determining a PE. 
85 As a consequence of the scope and focus of this article (allocation of the right to tax), 
the profit allocation rules proposed in Article 5 are not further analysed. For more on 
how profits could be attributed to a digital PE see Yariv Brauner and Pasquale Pistone, 
‘Some Comments on the Attribution of Profits to the Digital Permanent 
Establishment’ (2018) 72 Bulletin for International Taxation 4a. 
86 The encompassed corporate taxes are listed in Annex I to the directive proposal. 
87 However, the Commission has adopted a recommondation which recommends that 
Member States negotiate the necessary adaptions to their tax treaties with third 
countries, so as to bring provisions on significant digital presence into effect. See 
Comission Recommendation of 21 March 2018 relating to the corporate taxation of a 
siginicant digital presence, C(2018) 1650 final. Moreover, as set out in the Directive 
Proposal COM(2018) 147 final [footnote 14], p. 1-4, the intention is that the proposal 
should contribute to the ongoing efforts of the OECD and that similar provisions 
eventually should become part of the OECD model, as well as the Commission’s 
preferred overall solution; the common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB).   
88 Para. 6 in the commentaries to article 5(1) of the OECD Model (2017). 
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business in the user-jurisdictions, because no or limited human 
intervention is needed, it makes little sense to interpret the phrase in line 
with its traditional understanding. Despite this, the proposal does not 
contain any material guidance on how to interpret this phrase. 
Pursuant to Article 4(3), a significant digital presence shall be 
considered to exist in a Member State if the business carried on through 
it consists wholly or partly of the supply of digital services through a 
digital interface and one or more of three conditions is met.89 Before 
dealing with the three conditions, it is worth taking a closer look at the 
concepts of digital services and digital interface. 
Starting with the last concept, digital interface is briefly defined in 
the proposal’s Article 3(2) as any software, including a website or a part 
thereof and applications, including mobile applications accessible by 
users. This definition is very broad and seems to cover most, if not all, 
digital interfaces currently used for digital intermediary platforms. 
A more elaborate definition is provided in Article 3(5) with respect 
to the concept of digital services.90 Accordingly, digital services should be 
understood as services delivered over the internet or an electronic 
network and the nature of which renders their supply essentially 
automated and involving minimal human intervention and impossible to 
ensure in the absence of information technology. It should be noted that 
‘minimal human intervention’ means that the services involve minimal 
human intervention on the side of the platform enterprise without any 
regard to the level of human intervention on the side of the users (which 
may be substantial). In this regard, a digital intermediary platform must 
also be regarded as requiring minimal human intervention in situations 
where the platform enterprise initially sets up the system, regularly 
maintains and updates the system, or repairs it in cases of problems 
linked with its functioning.91 However, it is important to note that the 
mere sale of services facilitated by using a digital intermediary platform is 
not regarded as a digital service for the providing user (for exampel the 
Uber-driver or the lettor of an apartment on Airbnb). In other words, it 
is the platform enterprise that gives access to the digital intermediary 
                                                        
89 Whether the conditions are met should be evaluated with respect to the entity 
carrying on that business, taken together with the supply by each of that entity’s 
associated enterprises in aggregate. The term “associate enterprise” is defined in art. 
3(9).    
90 Article 3(5) includes a list of services which in particular are considered digital serives. 
These examples further underline the broad scope of the concept and makes it even 
clearer that also the services supplied by a digital intermediary platform in a Member 
State may constitute a significant digital presence. These examples are complemented 
by a list of encompassed digital services in Annex II to the directive proposal. Annex 
III provides a list of services that are not included. 
91 Directive Proposal COM(2018) 147 final [footnote 14], p. 6-9. The definition 
corresponds to the definition of “electronically supplied services” in article 7 of the 
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 of 15 March 2011. 
NJCL 2018/1 
 
169 
platform for remuneration (for example Uber or Airbnb) which is 
considered to provide digital services.92 
As mentioned above, a significant digital presence of a platform 
enterprise should only be considered to exist if one or more of the 
following three conditions are met; (a) the proportion of total revenues 
obtained in that tax period and resulting from the supply of digital 
services to users located in that Member State in that tax period exceeds 
EUR 7,000,000; (b) the number of users of one or more of digital 
services who are located in that Member State in that tax period exceeds 
100,000; or (c) the number of business contracts for the supply of any 
such digital service that are concluded in that tax period by users located 
in that Member State exceeds 3,000. 
With respect to condition (a) Article 3(6) prescribes that ‘revenues’  
basically means all proceeds of sale and of other transactions net of VAT 
and other taxes and duties, whether of a monetary or non-monetary 
nature. The proportion of total revenues in a Member State shall, 
pursuant to Article 4(7), be determined in proportion to the number of 
times that devices are used in a tax period by users located anywhere in 
the world to access the digital intermediary platform.  
With regard to both condition (a) and (b), a user shall, according to 
Article 4(4), be deemed to be located in a Member State in a tax period, 
if the user uses a device in that Member State in that tax period to access 
the digital intermediary platform. Moreover, the Member State where a 
user’s device is used shall be determined by reference to the Internet 
Protocol (IP) address of the devices or, if more accurately, any other 
method of geolocation. 
Even though condition (a) and (b) might seem relatively simple to 
apply, practical and interpretive difficulties must be expected to arise. 
For example, in practice, it might be difficult to delineate revenues 
obtained from the supply of digital services from other (related) kinds of 
revenue. In addition, it might not be particularly easy to keep sufficient 
track of the often vast numbers of users and their locations and at the 
same time preserve the privacy of the users.93 
Finally, with respect to condition (c), it is stipulated that a contract 
shall count as a business contract if the user concludes the contract in 
the course of carrying on business. It seems that this could include 
contracts concluded by “providing users” acting sufficiently frequently 
and professionally. However, it may be difficult for the platform 
                                                        
92 Directive Proposal COM(2018) 147 final [footnote 14], p. 6-9. 
93 Article 8 of the proposed directive states that the data collected shall be limited to 
data indicating the Member State in which the users are located, without allowing for 
identification of the user. Anyway, concern has been raised about the compatibility with 
EU privacy rules. See Cristiano Garbarini, Six questions plus one about the EU Directive on 
the taxation of a significant digital presence, Kluwer International Tax Blog  
<http://kluwertaxblog.com/2018/04/20/six-questions-plus-one-proposed-eu-
directive-taxation-significant-digital-presence/> (24 August 2018). 
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enterprise to know and control whether this is in fact the case. In 
addition, it is stated in Article 4(5) that such users shall be deemed to be 
located in a Member State in a tax period if the user is resident for tax 
purposes in that Member State in that tax period or the user is resident 
for corporate tax purposes in a third country but has a PE in that 
Member State in that tax period. As the domestic tax rules for 
determining residence vary between Member States, this link to domestic 
tax legislation may cause additional complexity. 
Overall, the proposed directive on significant digital presence is not 
without some merit. It addresses a legislative and political need to 
preserve Member States’ tax bases in a time where the new digital 
business models, including digital intermediary platforms, challenge the 
existing international tax regime. Correspondingly, the new concept 
enables the user-jurisdictions to tax (parts of) the profits generated by 
the interaction between the users and a foreign platform enterprise.94 
Furthermore, a uniform EU approach seems preferable to the 
proliferation of Member States’ unilateral approaches. 
However, some limitations of the proposal have to be emphasised. 
For example, and as identified above, a number of the terms used in the 
directive contain interpretive uncertainties, and in general the current 
proposal appears to need further work in order to become sufficiently 
clear and targeted. In addition, it may be questioned whether the 
thresholds are set at appropriate levels and whether the criteria are at risk 
of ring-fencing certain digital activities (too much). Further, it does not 
seem clear how enterprises relying on both a digital and a physical 
presence would be affected.95 Finally, and from a more political 
perspective, it should be factored in that it may not be easy to persuade 
non-EU treaty partners to alter the tax treaties in order to introduce a 
provision on significant digital presence.96 Should this be the case, it 
might cause a flow of digital business from the EU to other non-EU 
jurisdictions.97         
4. CONCLUSIONS 
As physical presence is still used as the nexus-defining criterium, 
platform enterprises are often able to provide their digital services 
without establishing a PE in the user-jurisdiction. This entails that user-
jurisdictions will normally be precluded from taxing the income of 
                                                        
94 However, if the new concept should be able to address the challenges it is crucial that 
appropriate attribution rules are adopted, in order to capture the value creation of the 
digital business models.  
95 This concern has also been raised with respect to the significant economic presence 
concept contemplated by the OECD. See  Olbert and Spengel (2017) [footnote 1].  
96 See also Kofler et al. (2017) [footnote 2], who argues that the appropriateness of 
different standards within and outside the EU is highly questionable.  
97 Garbarini (2018) [footnote 93]. 
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foreign platform enterprises, as the income should typically be classified 
as business income, pursuant to Article 7 of the OECD Model (2017), 
and since the platform enterprises are often able to deliver their digital 
services remotely. 
Taking a closer look at the interaction between the platform 
enteprises and the users, it may be possible to argue that some kind of 
barter transaction takes place, as the users of the digital intermidiary 
platform provide vital data to the platform enterprise in exchange for 
getting “free” access to the platform. However, even though it may be 
possible for some user-jurisdictions to find legal basis in existing tax 
legislation for taxing resident users of the receipt of a payment in kind 
(in the form of access to the platform), this does not seem to be a viable 
option in practice. 
As a consequence of the current lack of possibility for taxation in 
the user-jurisdictions, the European Commission’s recent proposal for a 
directive laying down rules relating to a significant digital presence seems 
to be particularly interesting, as it will enable user-jurisdictions within the 
EU to tax (parts of) the profits generated by foreign platform 
enterprises. Accordingly, even though the proposal needs further work 
in order to become sufficiently clear and targeted, and the scope may be 
limited in order not to cause treaty override, it may prove to be a step in 
the right direction, if adopted. 
